

The Power Of Political Investors In The Village Head Election In Madura

Mohammad Hidayaturrehman¹, Hisyamuddin Moh. Syah²,
Ida Syafriyani³, Ahmad Hasan Ubaid⁴

¹²³Universitas Wiraraja Madura, ⁴Universitas Brawijaya Malang

Corresponding author: hidayaturrehman@wiraraja.ac.id

Abstract

Democracy in Indonesia is much broader than democracy in developed countries such as America and Europe. This can be seen from the democracy practiced in Indonesia down to the village level. Village head elections have been carried out directly for generations. Public participation in the village head election is also the highest of all existing contestations. Political participation of village residents continues to grow. One form of participation that brings problems is the involvement of political funders known as political investors in village head elections. This research was conducted to determine the role of political investors in village head elections in Sumenep, Madura, East Java. The research used descriptive qualitative methods and data collection techniques using in-depth interviews with informants who were directly involved in village head election activities. In addition, document searches were carried out regarding activities related to the election of village heads and the relationship between village head candidates and political investors. This research reveals the important role of investors in winning village head candidates. Political investors receive compensation for the funding provided, in the form of positions for families in village governments that have been funded. Apart from that, political investors receive economic benefits in the form of village projects and village land management rights. This research has limitations at the location scale, which only covers three villages in Sumenep Regency, Madura.

Keywords: Political investors; village head election; political funding.

Abstrak

Demokrasi di Indonesia bila dilihat pada praktiknya, jauh lebih luas daripada demokrasi di negara maju seperti Amerika dan Eropa. Hal ini bisa dilihat dari demokrasi yang dipraktikkan di Indonesia sampai pada level desa. Pemilihan kepala desa telah dilaksanakan secara langsung secara turun-temurun. Partisipasi publik pada pemilihan kepala desa juga paling tinggi dari seluruh kontestasi yang ada. Partisipasi politik warga desa terus berkembang. Salah satu bentuk partisipasi yang membawa persoalan adalah keterlibatan pemberi dana politik yang disebut sebagai investor politik pada pemilihan kepala desa. Penelitian ini dilakukan untuk mengetahui peran investor politik pada pemilihan kepala desa di Sumenep, Madura, Jawa Timur. Penelitian menggunakan metode kualitatif deskriptif dan teknik pengumpulan data menggunakan wawancara mendalam kepada informan yang terlibat secara langsung pada aktivitas pemilihan kepala desa. Selain itu dilakukan penelusuran dokumen terhadap aktivitas yang berkaitan dengan pemilihan kepala desa dan hubungan calon kepala desa dengan investor politik. Penelitian ini mengungkap peran penting investor untuk memenangkan calon kepala desa. Investor politik mendapat imbalan atas pendanaan yang diberikan, berupa jabatan untuk keluarga pada pemerintahan desa yang telah didanai. Selain itu, investor politik mendapat keuntungan secara ekonomi berupa proyek desa dan hak kelola lahan desa. Penelitian ini

memiliki keterbatasan pada skala lokasi, yang hanya mencakup tiga desa di Kabupaten Sumenep, Madura.

Kata kunci: Investor politik; pemilihan kepala desa; pendanaan politik.

Introduction

The election of village heads is regulated in Law Number 6 of 2014 concerning Villages. The implementing regulations are regulated by Government Regulation Number 43 of 2014 concerning Villages (Femilia & Huda, 2020). In this Government Regulation, Article 46 regulates the implementation of village head elections which states that village head elections are regulated by a Minister of Home Affairs Regulation (Mahardika & Firdaus, 2022). Minister of Home Affairs Regulation Number 65 of 2017 concerning Amendments to Minister of Home Affairs Regulation Number 112 of 2014 regulates the election of village heads (Tome et al., 2019). The election of the village head has an important role in the development process, because the elected village head is at the forefront of implementing development at the lowest level in the government structure, who directly deals with residents every day. (Irawati, 2021). The village head has the simultaneous

responsibility to serve the village residents (Nurcholis, 2017).

As a political process that takes place in the democratic era, head elections necessitate the need for public participation (Averus & Alfina, 2020). Public participation in village head elections is a form of citizens' responsibility to develop the village (Haluana'a et al., 2020). This also provides important legitimacy for the elected village head (Abustan, 2022). Furthermore, direct public participation also causes polarization in society, based on preferences (Sofyan, 2021). Public participation in village head elections apparently does not only take the form of participation in nominating themselves as village head candidates, supporters or voters, but also in the form of support in providing funds to village head candidates (Astuti & Marlina, 2022).

The village head's political investors come from the economic elite in the village who in Madura are usually referred to as juragan (Ubaidillah & Kusairi, 2017). Juragan as the village

economic elite apart from participating politically also has a political interest in forming political power for certain purposes (Syahidah, 2022). Juragan plays by prioritizing his abilities as an owner of economic capital at the village level (Zamroni, 2012). The involvement of political investors from the local economic elite known as bosses is possible because of the large amount of funds required by the village head candidate, while the village head candidate does not have the financial capacity to fulfill it (Rahmi & Putra, 2022). The costs required by a prospective village head can range from hundreds of millions of rupiah (Bari et al., 2020).

Political investors in village head elections are involved in supporting village head candidates in the form of political funding providing financial support and assistance to the selected candidates. Political investors in the village usually have economic or political interests in the area and see the election of the village head as a means of gaining future profits. Political investors usually provide funds in stages to village head candidates. The village head then gave the funds to the

winning team. Usually before election day, the winning team distributes the money to potential voters. Political investors, or rich people who own these funds, then receive economic benefits from the elected village head. If someone loses, the money given becomes a debt which must still be returned by the prospective village head.

Investors are parties who invest funds to obtain economic benefits in the future (Legum, 2006). Investors are parties who carry out investment activities, by spending money currently, for business purposes (Chuang & Susmel, 2011). Investments can be made by individuals or groups or by certain business entities (Brennan, 1995). The more money invested, the greater the investor's expected profit. At the same time there is the potential for loss if the investment fails (Benartzi & Thaler, 2002). Political investors individuals or groups or corporations who have large amounts of funds invested in certain political activities, with the hope that the funds invested can gain profits in the future (Hidayaturrahman et al., 2022).

Political investors in village head elections usually have a relationship with the village head candidate, familial or friendly. Funds originating from political investors are usually used for campaign purposes, logistics, and so on. As happened in Matanair Village, Rubaru District, Sumenep Regency, Madura. A similar thing also happened in Ellak Daya Village, Lenteng District, and Kolpo Village, Batang District, Sumenep Regency, Madura. This research was conducted to reveal the role of political investors in winning village head candidates in Sumenep, Madura.

Method

This research uses a qualitative method to describe the role of political investors in village elections in Sumenep Regency, Madura, East Java. This research was carried out in three villages in Sumenep Regency, in 2023. The selection of three villages was based on political events in these three which were quite prominent in every village head election, especially with the presence of funders or investors in the elections in the three villages, namely Ellak Daya Village, Lenteng

District, Matanair Village, Rubaru District, and Kolpo Village, Batang-Batang District, Sumenep Regency, Madura, East Java. The selection of three villages was also intended to cross-check information regarding the existence of political investors in the village head election in Sumenep, Madura. So that the data obtained in each village mutually correct each other. This research location which is more than three villages is also a triangulation of research data sources. The research data source consists of three different villages, from three different sub-districts in the Sumenep Regency area, Madura.

The data collection technique for this research was carried out through in-depth interviews with various informants who were directly involved in the election of three village heads in Sumenep Regency, Madura. The informants interviewed consisted of village head candidates, the winning team for village head candidates, political investors who funded the village head candidacy, and voters. The informants interviewed are clearly mentioned in the following table.

Table 1. List of Informants Interviewed, 2023.

Nu m	Initi al	Gend er	Attributi on	Addres s
1	A-R	Male	Head village candidat e	Matana ir, Rubaru District
2	A-P	Male	Political investor	Matana ir, Rubaru District
3	H-B	Male	Voter	Matana ir, Rubaru District
4	H-A	Fema le	Head village candidat e	Kolpo, Batang - Batang District
5	A-R	Male	Political investor	Kolpo, Batang - Batang District
6	H-N	Male	Voter	Kolpo, Batang

				- Batang District
7	A-U	Male	Head village candidat e	Ellak Daya, Lenten g District
8	N- W	Male	Political investor	Ellak Daya, Lenten g District
9	A-H	Male	Voter	Ellak Daya, Lenten g District

Apart from that, data collection techniques were also carried out by searching for documents that were relevant and directly related to political investment in village head elections. The documents collected were in the form of photographs relating to the relationship and closeness between political investors and village head candidates. These two different data

collection techniques are also useful for cross-checking the techniques used in research. Cross-checking data collection techniques, namely in-depth interviews with relevant document searches. What was conveyed by informants during in-depth interviews was cross-checked with existing documents.

The data that has been collected, then analyzed. Data analysis here includes solving the problem/phenomenon being studied, then understanding the data that has been collected, and evaluating the data and information collected. The data analysis technique used in this research uses Miles, Huberman and Saldana data analysis techniques. According to Miles, Huberman and Saldana, technical data analysis includes describing, interpreting and drawing conclusions based on patterns, relationships and meaning contained in the data that researchers have collected. Data analysis is carried out to gain a deeper understanding, identify relevant conclusions or findings, and provide critical thinking about the problem or phenomenon studied by the research (Miles et al., 2015).

Result and Discussion

This research uses the power elite theory proposed by Wright Mills as the focus. According to Mills, there are three forces that control politics, namely wealth and capital ownership, connections and networks, and political influence (Agger, 1957). These three indicators are also used as the focus in this research. First, wealth and capital ownership. The existence of capital when nominating a village head is a determining factor in the village head's victory. This is confirmed by A-R village head candidate. According to him, the presence of investors or financiers during the nomination for village head strengthens support for the village head candidate. This happens because the capital for winning a village head candidate amounts to hundreds of millions. Candidates who are considered to have the funds have a big chance of winning the contest. *"For the total amount I spent 450-500 million, yes."* (Interview with A-R, candidate for village head, at his home, on June 21 2023). This was confirmed by another village head candidate, H-A, who had run for village head twice and served twice. H-A admitted that each time he

nominates he spends around IDR 500 million. *"The biggest contributor is usually an individual or group, who then gets a share from village officials or is given a project."* (Interview with H-A, candidate for village head at his home on July 09, 2023). *Second*, connections and networks. The network that political investors have is a family or friendship network with village heads candidate. Investors only want to finance or issue funds and give them to prospective village heads because they have a friendship or kinship relationship. So not everyone who needs funds is funded during the nomination process. This is also intended to show the existence of political influence in the village for political friends and opponents. This was stated by A-U, one of the village head candidates who also received funds from political investors. *"Between candidates and investors is based on kinship relations which aim to increase the influence and honor of the family in village politics."* (Interview with A-U, candidate for village head in his office, on June 23, 2023). H-A, another candidate for village head, said the same thing. According to H-A, the main financial backer is his family. This

is effective in achieving victory. The proof is that H-A and his family have served as village heads for four generations. *"It's not just me who is embarrassed, but my family is also embarrassed if I lose. So, everything is done during the village elections, even though it costs a lot of money, the important thing is to win."* (Interview with H-A, candidate for village head at his home, July 09, 2023).

Third, political influence. Political investors have dominant political influence when voters in village head elections are increasingly pragmatic. They tend to vote for candidates who have a lot of money. So, there is a tendency for candidates who have a lot of political funds to have a chance of winning the contest. To win a contest with such voter conditions is of course not cheap, it is very expensive. In this section, political investors have a big influence. This was conveyed by A-P, a political investor. *"Now there is a lot of capital for candidates, so you can't get the capital yourself if the people here are in difficulties, so you need help from other people to fund it. It is not impossible, if the funds are very large, to be able to win the election."*

(Interview with A-P, political investor at home, June 21, 2023). This was confirmed by N-W, one of the political investors. According to him, no matter how good a candidate's image is, if they are not supported by large funds, they will lose. *"The proof is in yesterday's village elections, the candidate who was expected to win because of support from his father in-laws, but because his father in-laws died before the election, ended up losing."* (Interview with N-W, political investor at home, July 04, 2023). Voters also consider the candidate with the most funds to have a chance of winning. This was stated by one of the voters H-B. *"Now who doesn't use money if they want to run for village head. If it's only 10 million or 20 million, it doesn't have a big impact."* (Interview with H-B, voter at his home, July 10, 2023).

Based on the data collected, it was revealed that there were three types of political investors in village head elections. *First*, political investors in the form of individuals. Usually, individual political investors are people who have businesses that are considered successful at the village level. Could be a tobacco entrepreneur, entrepreneur in

the agricultural sector or others. Their involvement in winning village heads is usually because they want to gain economic benefits, such as the right to manage village asset land that can be planted with tobacco while the funded village head is in office. This type of investor usually has a close relationship with the prospective village head through a network of friends.

Second, political investors in the form of groups that invest in village head elections in a joint venture. Political investors like this are usually not very prominent economically, but they have wealth above the average villager, or are economically well established among the general public. Group investors usually have a close relationship with the prospective village head, as family. The involvement of political investors in this group model usually has the aim of obtaining a position in the village government, when the funded village head is elected.

Third, political investors in the form of groups of gamblers. Gamblers who have a friendly relationship with the village head candidate, or have a close relationship with one of the winning teams for the village head

candidate, are willing to fund the village head candidate, because they are betting on the victory of the candidate they support. Gamblers usually pay it directly to voters to buy votes for prospective voters, without depositing it with the village head candidate. A prospective village head just needs to know how much funds have been spent, and to whom the funds have been given.

Political investors in the village head election in Sumenep Regency, Madura can be analyzed using elite theory. In Madura there are several local elite groups, namely kiai, nobles, blater, head village, rich people. These local elites have authority and influence in determining political dynamics and regulations at the local and regional levels (A'La et al., 2018). As local elites, political investors who have more wealth than the average villager are seen as respectable by the village community (Rasaili, 2023). What he did also became a concern for the village community. It is not only a concern, but also a reference for village communities.

As local elites, the role of political investors in local political contestation and village head elections

is then analyzed using elite theory. According to Mills, politics is influenced by local political elites (Mawardi, 2019). In elite theory, a handful of elites, whether economic elites or political elites, can influence the choices of the masses/ public. The presence of elites in society can be seen as something natural. The existence of elites in society emerged as a result of natural selection. Individuals who have more abilities than the population average have the opportunity to stand out and be more dominant than others. This is seen as a normal thing. According to Gaetano Mosca, the existence of elites in society is something that cannot be avoided as a result of differences in the skills and abilities of each person in society (Meisel, 1958). The presence of local economic elites at the local political level seems unavoidable, including their involvement in local political contestations, village head elections. This is driven by internal factors and external factors of political investors.

First, external factors. External factors are society, conditions or the environment outside political investors, such as the views of society in general,

the condition of village head candidates who do not have the funds to win the village head election. Village communities generally view land-owning communities as an honorable group, having a higher social status than society in general. This is demonstrated by research conducted by Sifra Damongilala and friends. Rich people in Betelen 1 Village, Tombatu District, Southeast Minahasa Regency have a higher social status than most people. This is formed because of various facilities owned by rich people that are not owned by ordinary people, such as land assets, nice houses, vehicles, including a happier family life, etc (Damongilala et al., 2014). Apart from that, rich people in the village also have the ability to give charity, this ability is of course not possessed by people who do not have economic ability. Including the involvement of rich people in village development (Asmuni, 2014). The public's view of the rich people in the village makes the rich people reflect themselves as an established, respectable group. In this way, efforts are made to show one's existence in the village. One of the important moments at the village level is the election of the

village head. Rich people in the village are also influenced to get involved in supporting village head candidates, in the form of providing funds. The village head who was supported and managed to win further strengthened the public's opinion that the village head won because he was supported by the rich man. If don't have the support of rich people, won't win.

The external factor that makes rich people invest their money in village head elections is the condition of village head candidates who do not have the funds to win the election. This encourages rich people to help village head candidates who do not have money to help them win. However, support from rich people for village head candidates does not just happen, but this support is given because there is a relationship of closeness, kinship or friendship between the village head candidate and political investors.

Second, internal factors. There is motivation for rich people to invest their funds in village head elections. According to David McClelland, humans are motivated by three things, achievement, power and affiliation (McClelland, 1965). The desire for

achievement includes the desire to strive to succeed and outperform others. The need for power motivates individuals to do anything to gain power. The need for affiliation will only be met by being on good terms with others, including helping others. Political investors involved in supporting village head candidates are motivated to gain affiliation as well as gain power because they make the most powerful person at the village level. This is also an achievement in itself, being able to make other people achieve power.

Conclusion

The strength or power of political investors in local political contestation is examined in this research. Political investors have an important role in the election of village heads in Sumenep Regency, Madura. The role of political investors in supporting funding for village head candidates. Funds provided by political investors are used by village head candidates to win the nomination process. The money given by political investors is given to the winning team to finance various winning needs, from

campaign costs to buying the votes of prospective voters. The existence of political investors in village head elections is driven by the condition of village head candidates who need a lot of funds to win the contest. The political investment given becomes a debt that the prospective village head must pay to the investor. If you win, you will be paid a position in the village government to someone close to the investor to occupy a certain position in the village government. Apart from that, it is also paid for by the development program at the location requested by political investors sourced from the Village Fund. However, if the candidate for the funded village loses, then the debt is paid in money.

Reference

- Abustan. (2022). Implementation of democracy and legitimacy of acting regional heads in indonesia. *Indonesia Law Reform Journal*, 2(3), 274–287.
<https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.22219/ilrej.v2i3.22202>
- Agger, R. E. (1957). The Power Elite. by C. Wright Mills. *Social Forces*, 35(3), 287–288.

- <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.2307/2573526>
- A'La, A., Zamzami, M., Udin, N. H. W., & Aniq, A. F. (2018). Islamism in Madura from religious symbolism to authoritarianism. *Journal of Indonesian Islam*, 12(2), 159–194. <https://doi.org/10.15642/JIIS.2018.12.2.159-194>
- Asmuni. (2014). Emancipation of village elites and utilization of social capital in Bumdes Management. *JPPUMA: Jurnal Ilmu Pemerintahan Dan Sosial Politik UMA (Journal of Governance and Political Social UMA)*, 4(2), 19–30. <https://doi.org/10.31289/jppuma.v2i1.582>
- Astuti, P., & Marlina, N. (2022). Money politics in village head elections: Is it really a determinant of voters' choices? *JiIP: Jurnal Ilmiah Ilmu Pemerintahan*, 7(2), 151–162. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.14710/jiip.v7i2.16035>
- Averus, A., & Alfina, D. (2020). Political participation in the village head election. *Moderat: Jurnal Ilmiah Ilmu Pemerintahan*, 6(3), 585–609. <https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.25157/moderat.v6i3.3996>
- Bari, A., Suhartono, S., & Setyorini, E. H. (2020). Potential criminal acts of corruption by village heads in indonesia. *Jurnal YUSTITIA*, 21(1), 51–61. <https://doi.org/10.53712/yustitia.v21i1.815>
- Benartzi, S., & Thaler, R. H. (2002). How much is investor autonomy worth? *The Journal of Finance*, 57(4), 1593–1616. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6261.00472>
- Brennan, M. J. (1995). The individual investor. *The Journal of Financial Research*, 18(1), 59–74. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6803.1995.tb00211.x>
- Chuang, W. I., & Susmel, R. (2011). Who is the more overconfident trader? Individual vs. institutional investors. *Journal of Banking and Finance*, 35(7), 1626–1644. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2010.11.013>
- Damongilala, S., Opod, H., & Sinolungan, J. S. V. (2014). The relationship of socio-economic status with happiness families in betelen village community 1 tombatu district, southeast minahasa district. *Jurnal E-Biomedik (EBM)*, 2(2), 467–470. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.35790/ebm.v2i2.5000>
- Femilia, Y., & Huda, U. N. (2020). The village's authority in spatial planning is based on the village law. *ADLIYA*:

- Jurnal Hukum Dan Kemanusiaan*, 14(1), 121–140.
<https://doi.org/10.15575/adliya.v14i1.5752>
- Haluana'a, F. J., Nasution, I., & Batubara, , Masitho Beby. (2020). Analysis of people's participation in orahili's headman election of pulau-pulau subdistrict south nias district. *Jurnal Ilmu Pemerintahan, Administrasi Publik, Dan Ilmu Komunikasi (JIPIKOM)*, 2(1), 46–52.
<https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.31289/jipikom.v2i1.180>
- Hidayaturrehman, M., Ngarawula, B., & Sadhana, K. (2022). Political investors: Political elite oligarchy and mastery of regional resources in Indonesia. *Asian Journal of Comparative Politics*, 7(2), 269–281.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/2057891120917213>
- Irawati, E. (2021). Increasing village capacity based on law no. 6 of 2014 (A study on village autonomy). *Jurnal Inovasi Penelitian*, 2(2), 635–640.
<https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.47492/jip.v2i2.719>
- Legum, B. (2006). Defining investment and investor: Who is entitled to claim? *Arbitration International*, 22(4), 521–526.
<https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1093/arbitration/22.4.521>
- Mahardika, V. V., & Firdaus, U. S. (2022). Analysis of law number 6 of 2014 concerning villages. *Jurnal Demokrasi Dan Ketahanan Nasional* |, 1(1), 205–211.
<https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.13057/souvereignty.v1i1.213>
- Mawardi, A. I. (2019). Charles wright mills and the power elite theory: Reading the context and mapping political sociology theory about power elite class. *Jurnal Sosiologi Pendidikan Humanis*, 4(2), 73–83.
<https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.17977/um021v4i2p73-83>
- Mcclelland, D. C. (1965). Toward a theory of motive acquisition. *American Psychologist*, 20(5), 321–333.
<https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1037/h0022225>
- Meisel, J. H. (1958). The Myth of the Ruling Class: Gaetano Mosca and the Elite. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 1(5), 42–43.
<https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1177/000276425800100519>
- Miles, M., Huberman, M., & Saldana, J. (2015). *Qualitative data analysis: a methods sourcebook* (3rd ed., Vol. 3). SAGE Publications.
- Nurcholis, H. (2017). Public services in villages. *Jurnal Ilmu Administrasi*

- Negara ASIAN*, 5(2), 47–60.
<https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.47828/jianaasian.v5i2.5>
- Rahmi, N. A. K., & Putra, E. V. (2022). Praktik Politik Uang Pada Pemilihan Kepala Desa. *Jurnal Perspektif*, 5(3), 423–431.
<https://doi.org/10.24036/perspektif.v5i3.642>
- Rasaili, W. (2023). Local politics and democracy on policy implementation in madura, indonesia. *GOVERNABILITAS (Jurnal Ilmu Pemerintahan Semesta)*, 4(1), 48–64.
<https://doi.org/10.47431/governabilitas.v4i1.283>
- Sofyan, A. (2021). Community participation in the implementation of the village head election (pilkades) in sukamulya village, rumpin district, bogor regency, 2019. *Dinamika : Jurnal Ilmiah Ilmu Administrasi Negara*, 8(1), 2–10.
<https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.25157/dinamika.v8i1.4805>
- Syahidah, J. A. (2022). The role of kiai in local political contestation in madura. *Journal of Constitutional Law and Governance*, 2(2), 213–225.
<https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.19105/asshahifah.v2i2.7992>
- Tome, A. H., Rusman, Moh. Z., & Ibrahim, Moh. S. (2019). Local government policy in the implementation of village head elections. *Al-Adalah: Jurnal Hukum Dan Politik Islam*, 3(2), 128–140.
<https://doi.org/10.35673/ajmpi.v3i2.195>
- Ubaidillah, K., & Kusairi, L. (2017). Tauke, juragan, bandol: Patron-client relations and social transformation in tobacco trade organizations in madura. *Jurnal ETNOHISTORI*, 4(1), 22–38.
<https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.33387/jeh.v4i1.918>
- Zamroni, M. I. (2012). The power of juragan and kiai in madura. *Karsa: Jurnal Sosial Dan Budaya Keislaman (Journal of Social and Islamic Culture)*, 12(2), 161–167.
<https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.19105/karsa.v12i2.140>